Making a Choice

Book Review

Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power

ISBN: 9781863956093

Recently, the growing rivalry between China and Japan has dominated discussions on Asia-Pacific affairs.  There was China’s announcement on ADIZ, which was then countered by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.  With both sides claiming that they are presently experiencing one of the lowest points of their bilateral relations, we in Southeast Asia can only hope that there would be some breakthroughs to bring back confidence and stability to the regional outlook.

Hardcover version

But somehow the growing tensions between China and Japan seem only a reflection of the bigger rivalry existing in the Asia-Pacific (or in the world as a whole): the China-US rivalry.  Yes, Japan is vying for greater influence in international affairs.  And yes, Japan is one of the strongest economies in the world.  But Japan is a US ally, whose security is dependent on this North American hegemon.  And so, when we talk about the China-Japan rivalry within the context of regional peace and security, then it is rather obvious that the US’ hands are deep in this melee.

Many academic and journalistic works have been written, discussed, and undergone criticisms on the US-China rivalry.  Naturally, some are more enlightened than others.  But all of them have been meaningful additions to the pool of knowledge on the study of contemporary Asia-Pacific regional studies.  As a life-long student, I can only appreciate these academic and journalistic works, one of which can be found in The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power.

Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, argues that there are more than two choices for the US in its dealing with the Chinese.  Of course, the first two choices are commonly known: to confront the Chinese (as a means to preserve American dominance over the region) OR to allow China’s rise to dominance in the region (while hoping that China will not have any tendency to cause conflict, particularly with the US). 

In this fantastic book, White elaborates on a third choice for the US, and that is to share power with China.  He argues that both China and the US have every capacity to deny leadership to the other.  However, for one of them to single-handedly, truly dominate the Asia-Pacific, that would almost be impossible. As a result, the idea of the US maintaining uncontested leadership in the region is as illusory as the fear that China will one day be at the top of the Asia-Pacific, alone and unchallenged.

There is Cold War-like belief among many Americans that countries in the Asia-Pacific could somehow be wooed into siding with them.  “An aggressive and hegemonic China would not be good for the region”, they would say, “Thus, justifying any effort to limit China’s power.”  However, the truth is that many countries in the region view the world from a more complex set of lenses, and not just the black-and-white perspective offered by the Americans. White explains that unlike the situation with the Soviets, many Asia-Pacific countries “have much to gain from China economically, and little to fear politically”.

Kindle version

Indeed, many Americans may think that preventing China from disrupting the regional order is beneficial not only in securing their own interests, but also those of the entire region (how noble..!).  However, as White argues, the Chinese see “a parallel, but opposite symmetry”.  They believe that China is seeking to remedy the long injustices that have been dealt to them, especially by foreign powers, both western and Asian.  Therefore, any power that intends to preserve the status quo regional order is in fact perpetuating these injustices.  Not only for the Chinese, but also for the other Asia-Pacific countries that have not entirely benefitted from the US’s regional dominance.

What White proposes is a new concert of Asia, which is loosely modeled on the Concert of Europe that existed between 1815 and 1914.  Admittedly, the Concert of Europe was not perfect.  There was still conflict during those times, including the war for German unification.  Worse of all, the regional order then ended in a devastating bang: the First World War.  However, as a whole, conflicts among Great Powers were avoided because each Great Power recognized that they must not seek dominance over the entire region.  And most importantly, during that period, Europe experienced a massive growth in the economic, social, and political fields.

The Asian version of this concert would have four “Great Powers” as the prime movers of the region: the US, China, Japan, and India.  Then there would be “middle powers” such as South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia (surprisingly, White didn’t mention anything about Australia) completing the hierarchy of power.  White goes on to argue that Indonesia, if it continues to grow the way it has, has every potential to end up as an additional “true” Great Power some time down the line. 

The rules of this concert sound simple:

First, each power must accept the legitimacy of the other power’s political system.  In other words, for the Americans, no more trying to cause (or make appear as though there are) domestic instabilities in China. 

Second, by agreeing to disagree, each power must be willing to make concessions in order to achieve resolutions through peaceful negotiations.

Third, each power must allow the others to build up their armaments, and allow the use of them if there are forces challenging their status as a “great power”.

And fourth, the powers must be able to develop a “code of conduct” that would “govern” their interactions with one another.

Of course, this perspective is far from perfect.  In fact, it has many holes.  For one, as an Indonesian, I would yell out: “Where’s Indonesia in all of this?”  Indonesia may not have the many of capacities owned by the Chinese or the Americans.  But we are the largest country and economy in Southeast Asia, and a leader in ASEAN.  In fact, I’ll yell out again: “What will happen to ASEAN and its regional architecture then?”

In this regard, White may have not sold me entirely on his idea.  But one thing that I do appreciate is his willingness to go outside of the box and propose an alternative to the rut that we are presently in.  I feel that there must be more than two choices to deal with China.  Choices other than confronting China head-on OR appeasing China’s rise to regional dominance.  There must be.  And while the argument proposed in this book may not be entirely convincing, it does present us with some food for thought, and importantly, stimuli for future thinking on the topic of China-US rivalry.

Personally, I believe that Indonesia is a middle power, for now, and maybe even in the long run.  However, that should not relegate its participation in the region (or even the “Concert of Asia”) to insignificance.  Maybe there should be analyses of what a middle power status could truly mean in a “Concert of Asia”.  On what counts as a middle power.  Maybe then I would be more willing to explore further this proposal. 

Time may not be on our side, as White says.  If China’s power keep on growing the way it is doing now, then its economy would be bigger than the US’ and its military more capable of keeping up with the Americans’.  Therefore, it is in the US’ interests to negotiate a new relationship with China, before the power balance further shift in China’s way.  In this regard, the urgency of this process is also in the interest of other countries in the region, including Indonesia.

The China-ASEAN Symposium in Guizhou

Clipping from Indonesian Mandarin-language newspaper, Guoji Ribao,1 August 2012

On 27-28 July 2012, I was invited to participate in the China-ASEAN Symposium held at Guizhou University, Guiyang, PRC.

It was my first trip to Guiyang, a city in the southwest of China which has been left behind by the progress of today's China.  A city colored by the diverse traditions, languages, and customs of the Miao, Buoyi, and other ethnic minorities.  A city which often calls itself as the "reddest" (i.e. most Communist) in the country.  A city which is only now catching up to the economic miracle already savored by China's coastal cities.

The symposium itself was quite a productive occasion.  At the heart of the discussions was the progress of cooperation between ASEAN and China as well as the state of studies in China, ASEAN, and ASEAN-China relations. In addition to Southeast Asia and ASEAN experts from all over China, the symposium organizers also invited experts from all ASEAN member countries, except Vietnam (apparently the Vietnamese had been invited, but couldn't respond in time).

I found the discussions, including during coffee breaks and meals, very honest.  The Chinese academics spoke their minds, which often is a more flowery regurgitation of the government's position.  However, many times these academics also talked about the worries China live with, thus showing a more human face to the rising power that China is.

At a time when China-ASEAN relations seem to face a slight hiccup, following incidents in the South China Sea and the recent AMM debacle (in which the Cambodians have been accused of succumbing to Chinese pressure in its handling of the ASEAN Chairmanship), the symposium provided a means to once again recognize the benefits and value (as well as challenges) of the ASEAN-China partnership.

I had a good time there.  Both because of the conference, but also because of the chance to visit yet another part of China which I had never been too.  I've studied this country and lived in it for some time.  I'm no expert, but I'd like to think of myself as an avid observer.  And yet, there are always surprises around the corner; places, people, and things that make me marvel, raise my eyebrows, smile, and what-have-you.

I love this job...

Indonesia and Australia's Relationship Has Room to Grow

(Repost of article written with Junianto James Losari and published in The Jakarta Globe on 6 July 2012)

Indonesia-Australia relations have grown steadily since their lowest point in the late 1990s. We have matured in our appreciation of one another as regional powers in this Asia-Pacific Century. And tragedies like the Bali bombing and the Aceh tsunami have brought us closer as neighbors.

A recent survey by Australia’s Lowy Institute pointed out that most Indonesians rated Australia as one of the most trusted countries to act responsibly at the international stage.

However, as much as these conditions have augured better feelings of closeness, it is not difficult to see that bilateral cooperation has been overshadowed by issues in the political and security fields. While economic opportunities are abundant, Indonesia and Australia have yet to maximize on this potential.

This appears to be the message that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tried to convey during his visit to Darwin earlier this week, as part of the 2nd Annual Leaders Meeting.  Among the many areas of bilateral cooperation currently existing, Yudhoyono chose to focus on trade, investment, connectivity and tourism.

Indeed, in economic terms, Indonesia and Australia are not minnows. As emerging economies and part of the G-20, the two countries’ economic performance has in recent years commanded the attention of many around the world.

Not only that, there is considerable complement between the two economies, as shown by the differences in goods and services produced and consumed. These conditions should make the Indonesia-Australia economic partnership matter significantly. But the truth is that trade growth remains sluggish.

In 2011, the two countries recorded total trade of $10.75 billion. This is an increase compared to previous years’ numbers. But if we were to compare them against Australia’s trade with Malaysia ($13 billion), Thailand ($15.3 billion) or Singapore ($20.7 billion), then Indonesians and Australians should expect more from their growing ties.

On investment cooperation, Indonesia remains Australia’s biggest blind spot. Up until 2010, Australian foreign direct investment to Indonesia stands at $3.55 billion, which amounts to 1.4 percent of its total FDI abroad. More concerning, the realization of Australian FDI in Indonesia in 2011 actually decreased about 58 percent from the previous year.

With a population of approximately 240 million, Indonesian consumers and labor resources not only provide a lucrative market, but also tremendous potential for Australian investment. We see this in Indonesia’s growing demand for beef, which is a result of the Indonesian people’s changing culinary habits and lifestyles.

As the growth of democracy complements economic achievements, the stable social and political conditions have generated a conducive domestic climate for greater foreign investment.

Nevertheless, while the numbers may not reflect Indonesia and Australia’s real economic potential, there are ways to boost this economic cooperation.

Indonesia’s entry-into-force of the Asean-Australia-New Zealand FTA this year is one of these means. Spanning 12 economies, around 600 million people and a combined GDP of $3.1 trillion, the AANZFTA covers the goods, services, investment and intellectual property sectors. While aimed at promoting the economic growth of all countries involved, the agreement should provide channels for enhancing trade and investment ties between Indonesia and Australia, which are by far the two largest economies in the group.

Tariff elimination under the AANZFTA will enable duty-free trade. Indonesian products benefitting from this arrangement include, wood, paper and paperboard, crude oil, plastic pipes and ceramics. Meanwhile, the benefitting Australian products include wheat, aluminum, cotton and fertilizer.

The AANZFTA also liberalizes investment in several areas for Australian companies, while at the same time providing a regime for the legal protection of investors. Such a framework, coupled with Indonesia’s positive investment climate, should provide sufficient reason for Australian companies to join efforts.

In addition, during the visit to Darwin, Yudhoyono welcomed efforts to begin negotiations for an Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. When completed, the agreement will provide a comprehensive, targeted framework for greater overall economic cooperation.

Among these targets would be to enhance connectivity at the national, bilateral and sub-regional levels. The strengthening of connectivity not only creates job opportunities through the investment in infrastructures, but also expands markets, trade flow and people-to-people connections.

Through participation in realizing Indonesia’s Master Plan for Expansion and Acceleration of Economic Development (MP3EI), Australia would not only assist Indonesia’s domestic connectivity, but also open opportunities for greater bilateral connectivity, particularly between Indonesia’s eastern parts and Australia’s Northern Territory.

The 1992 MoU signed between Indonesia and the Northern Territory is a basis for cooperation on primary and tertiary industries, air services, energy, professional services, manufacturing, processing, transport and infrastructure.

Government-to-government efforts will continue to evolve positively, yet the onus falls on the private sector to identify, grasp and maximize on these potential opportunities.

The Centrality of ASEAN in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

Indeed, Indonesia’s foreign policy needs to demonstrate assertiveness and independence.  However, as the largest and most populated country in Southeast Asia, being assertive and independent does not necessarily mean forsaking Indonesia’s role in ASEAN, even if the regional organization has lately been criticized from both within and abroad. 

And most importantly, in spite of making ASEAN the cornerstone of its foreign policy, Indonesia remains active in other engagement efforts beyond this regional body’s mechanism.  Although it has to be said that in larger forums, Indonesia has gained prominence as one of the few, if not the only, ASEAN country involved in forums such as G-20, OIC and between 2006-2008, in the UN Security Council.

Unlike the views expressed by Dr. Rizal Sukma in an article titled “Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy”, ASEAN remains valuable in Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly as a means to engage Indonesia’s closest neighbors as well as to project the country’s foreign policy ideals within and beyond the region.  At the same time, any challenges posed by Indonesia’s association with ASEAN do not constitute a hindrance to efforts at pursuing its national interests abroad.

Criticisms as well as certain levels of frustration have indeed been raised with regards to ASEAN’s development as a bona fide regional organization since its inception in 1967.  Among others, the centrality of ASEAN as the driving force for regionalization in the Asia Pacific has come under fire, thus leading to calls for re-assessing not only the centrality of ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy, but also Indonesia’s association with the regional body as a whole. 

One of the biggest criticisms against the credibility of ASEAN thus far has been the way in which the regional body has dealt with the issue of Myanmar.  While in the past such criticisms have mainly been expressed by the West, there is now also a growing dissenting voice from well within ASEAN.  Tied to this issue is the supposed inability of ASEAN to promote human rights issues in the region, thus becoming a thorn on the side of the regional body’s engagement with many dialogue partners.

Criticisms are also often lodged at the inability of ASEAN to resolve disputes among its members.  In recent times, the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand as well as the media-flared dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over maritime territories in the Sulawesi Sea are some of the examples in which ASEAN’s cohesion and lack of a peaceful dispute settlement mechanism are observed with much pessimism.

Issues of democracy, human rights and conflict prevention/resolution are indeed some of the elements of ASEAN’s vision of a peaceful, free, and prosperous Southeast Asian region, as enshrined in the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community signed in March 2009, which agreed on the political-security, economic, and socio-cultural blueprints for an ASEAN Community by 2015.

Nevertheless, as efforts in community-building take place, much needs to be understood with regards to how efforts conducted within the framework of ASEAN complement those carried out through bilateral or other multi-lateral means.  In a sense, on issues such as territorial disputes, in which two or more ASEAN members are involved, a peaceful settlement should be reached by the concerned sides, while making use of the conducive environment provided by years of dialogue within the ASEAN mechanism. 

Meanwhile, human rights issues approached through multilateral efforts such as the UN should in no way be considered either as a burden or challenge to efforts being carried out at the regional level by ASEAN.  If anything, the complementariness of these efforts should give way to a more comprehensive approach to the issue, as is the case with which the Myanmar issue is being dealt.

In efforts at community-building, it would be misleading to suggest that compromise has only been made by Indonesia.  Although needing to be assertive in its pursuit of national interests, and supposedly being in a position of dominance, Indonesia’s role in ASEAN should stem from respect and example, and not from authority.  In a community of nations as various as those in Southeast Asia, differences will continue to exist; how those differences could be narrowed, through ways including certain levels of compromise, should be the measure of success for such a community. 

With the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the development of the political-security, economic, and socio-cultural blueprints for an ASEAN Community, a strong basis has been created on which to construct a solid organization which is rules-based, integrated, and people-oriented.  Indeed, some of the difficulties faced by ASEAN thus far have been its flexibility and openness.  However, the development of the Charter and the three blueprints should evoke greater optimism about the prospects of ASEAN in the future.  At least, although not necessarily perfect to each member’s liking, these documents reflect a shared goal among ASEAN countries in building a community in the region.

To the general public eye, the benefits of ASEAN in the daily lives of member countries’ citizens are not always seen directly.  This, therefore, begs the question of ASEAN’s relevance in the local society.  However, as regional economic integration takes place, and ties among ASEAN countries are strengthened in all three pillars of cooperation, there will be an increased linkage between national policies and those implemented by ASEAN.  Indeed, the onus falls on each member country to implement on what it has agreed to carry out by 2015.

Indonesia’s foreign policy should not be seen as being imprisoned by the supposed lack of development in ASEAN.  If anything, ASEAN has progressed impressively since its establishment, with Indonesia continuously playing a constructive and innovative role.  Certainly, compromise has had to be made in ensuring progress within ASEAN, particularly considering the gaps existing among the membership.  Nonetheless, and without appearing apologetic, when considering the progress made thus far, and most importantly, the declared goal and vision to continue moving forward towards an ASEAN Community, then it would be unfair to view that Indonesia’s foreign policy has been entrapped by certain ways of ASEAN deemed inapt by a few.