In 2015, in the run up to the Young Strategists Forum Alumni Conference, which was held in Tokyo, Japan, I published a paper on the possible shape of Indonesia's foreign policy in the future. The paper took into account President Joko Widodo's recent rise to power, and the newly formed Indonesian Government's attempt to distance itself from the foreign policy achievements of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
The paper was included in a collection of views entitled "Next Generation Perspectives on the Future of Asian Security", which was edited by Princeton University Professor Aaron Friedberg.
Some of the views I shared in this short paper remains valid to this day, while others have completely been inaccurate. Regardless, as President Joko Widodo approaches re-elections, Indonesia's appeal in the international community remains high, with considerable achievements in bilateral engagements with key countries as well as regional and global community building with the likes of ASEAN, IORA, APEC, Asia-Africa, and the UN.
Below is the paper, for those who are interested in reading, particularly because it was previously only available in pdf form and rather difficult to obtain over google. Your suggestions and criticism are welcome.
Looking for Clues in
Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the Jokowi Era
by Santo Darmosumarto
Less
than three weeks after he had just been sworn in as Indonesia's seventh
President, Joko Widodo embarked on a whirlwind tour of three countries,
attending four summits, and introducing himself to the leaders of the region. Indeed, President Joko Widodo (more popularly
known as "Jokowi") was a figure much sought after by the likes of
Chinese President Xi Jinping, American President Barack Obama, and Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, all whom Jokowi met at his first stop in Beijing. Among
these three leaders, there was a sense of eagerness as to how President Jokowi
would respond to their invitations to form partnerships.
Three
months later, views on how President Jokowi performed at the APEC, ASEAN, East
Asia, and G-20 Summits are diverse. Some
feel reaffirmed in their belief that President Jokowi is a novice policymaker, while
others are surprised at the apparent ease with which the Indonesian leader stood
shoulder to shoulder with Xi, Obama, Abe, and other figures. Undoubtedly,
differences could be drawn between the foreign policy approaches of President
Jokowi, and those of his predecessor, the more seasoned internationalist, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono. However, the more pertinent question is whether such
differences would lead to major shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy.
As
the largest country in ASEAN, the fourth largest population in the world, and
the only Southeast Asian country in the G-20, Indonesia under the guidance of
Yudhoyono has grown into an influential player, not only in the Asia-Pacific,
but also in global affairs. And while Yudhoyono’s
successor is popular at home, not much is known about his views, let alone his track
record in foreign affairs. Indeed,
Widodo did not win Indonesia’s presidency because of his foreign policy
platform. Instead, his success was
primarily based on a promise to pay more attention to domestic issues. This has led many to question whether
Indonesia would continue on its trajectory to become an influential “middle
power” in regional and international affairs.
Indonesia's
Foreign Policy During the Yudhoyono Years
After years of soul-searching in the
wake of the multi-dimensional turmoil following the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis, former President Yudhoyono was successful in commandeering Indonesia's
re-emergence as an influential player in the region, and even at the global
level. Re-adapting Indonesia's foreign
policy philosophy of "free and active" diplomacy to current
geostrategic conditions, Yudhoyono was a darling of the international
community, as he advocated "a million friends, zero enemies" and
pushed for a "dynamic equilibrium" in power relations in the region. In
2012, at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Yudhoyono proposed the construction of an
"architecture of durable peace in the Asia-Pacific". He even dared to dream of "a harmony
among civilizations", during a well-received speech at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government.
In
a global order still plagued by uncertainties, Yudhoyono appeared determined to
strengthen Indonesia's capacity to become a key balancer, mediator, and
mobilizer, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. And why should it not be? At least in theory, a developing, Asian, and
predominantly Muslim country like Indonesia should be better accepted by both
the developing and developed worlds; the North and the South; the Muslim
countries and the rest. As if responding to criticisms from certain corners
that Indonesia had been "punching below its weight",
Yudhoyono, ably assisted by his foreign ministers (Hassan Wirajuda, and then,
Marty Natalegawa) worked hard to raise Indonesia's global profile.
Much
of the impetus for this effort derives from the potential leverage provided by
the Indonesia’s large population, economic boom, strategic geographical
location, and continued democratic and human rights achievements. Moreover, Indonesia is recognized as the
natural leader of ASEAN, as the regional organization strives to become the
center of the Asia-Pacific’s architecture for cooperation. As part of the G-20,
Indonesia frequently raised development issues among the world’s top earning
countries. And as Co-Chair of the UN High Level Panel on Post-2015 Development
Agenda, Yudhoyono pressed “third world” issues such as sustainable development,
poverty, inequality, and the protection of the environment. Moreover, on regional security issues, by seeking
a "dynamic equilibrium", Indonesia under Yudhoyono avoided common
tendencies to simply hedge against China’s influence in the region. At the same time, Indonesia was not
interested in relying on a US-based regional security guarantee.
These
developments, over a decade of Yudhoyono’s leadership, have raised questions
about the shape of Indonesia's foreign policy after his presidency. These
questions frequently center on the assumption that new President Jokowi has
limited foreign affairs credentials, and that he has risen to the top of
Indonesia's political scene on the basis of his views on domestic issues
instead. Regardless, expectations, both
at home and abroad, are high.
Looking for Clues in Jokowi's
Foreign Policy Vision
During
his election campaign, President Jokowi gave a few insights on his expectations
for Indonesia's foreign policy., including, the need for it to play the role of
an honest broker in dealing with the South China Sea issue. This view was delivered with the caveat that,
as a non-claimant state, Indonesia does not have direct interest in how the
territorial disputes are ultimately resolved. On other occasions, President Jokowi
mentioned his goal of furthering Indonesia's interests abroad through
maximizing its influence in ASEAN. Meanwhile, on multilateral issues, President
Jokowi highlighted the need to carry out reforms of global financial
institutions to better serve the interests of developing countries, like
Indonesia.
Other
than these glimpses of foreign policy activism, however, President Jokowi's
election campaign was very much dominated by domestic issues ranging from fuel
subsidies to good governance to economic resilience. Hence, there was much anticipation as to how
President Jokowi would introduce himself, and his foreign policy vision, during
the summits in Beijing, Nay Pyi Taw, and Brisbane at the end of 2014. At least, many observers were looking for
clues on whether Yudhoyono’s foreign policy activism would be carried over by
the new administration in Jakarta. On
the back of major domestic difficulties and divisive rivalry among its major
political parties, would Indonesia revert to a more introvert stance of the
world? Or would it continue to pursue
its role as the "middle power" in the Asia-Pacific, willing to stick
its neck out in order to ensure balance among the major and emerging powers in
the region?
On
his first opportunity to address the international community during the APEC
CEO Summit, President Jokowi gave a presentation on Indonesia's readiness to
welcome investors. While recognizing the
significance of foreign participation in the country's economic development,
President Jokowi emphasized the concrete actions that would be carried out
domestically to raise investor confidence.
He highlighted some of the problems affecting Indonesia's business
sector, and gave his commitment to addressing these problems in the most
efficient and timely way. While the
presentation did receive a warm welcome from the audience (who were mostly
businesspeople and the media), it did not elaborate on his vision of
Indonesia’s maritime prowess.
In
Nay Pyi Taw, however, President Jokowi outlined Indonesia's ambition to become
a "Global Maritime Nexus". The
pursuit of this goal would be carried out based on the five pillars of: 1)
reviving the Indonesian people's maritime culture; 2) building maritime
"food sovereignty" through a strengthened fisheries industry; 3)
boosting the maritime economy through strengthening connectivity
(infrastructure) and tourism; 4) strengthening maritime diplomacy to overcome
traditional and non-traditional conflicts at sea; and 5) bolstering maritime
defenses to uphold territorial integrity and safeguard national security. President Jokowi also recognized Indonesia's
role as a "fulcrum between two oceans", a position which demands the
country's activism in addressing regional maritime security and safety of
navigation issues.
The
events in China and Myanmar led to some commentators highlighting the maritime
and economic aspects of Indonesia's new diplomacy under President Jokowi. But while some are intrigued at how other
countries could take advantage of Indonesia's interest in these issues to
further their own foreign policy designs, others are already asking more
long-term questions. Will Indonesia’s
focus on maritime and economic issues be enough to drive a foreign policy that
leads to some form of leadership in the region?
Or are these issues simply raised with a view to securing Indonesia's
domestic agenda, thus paying little heed to the greater demands for
participation in ensuring regional peace and stability?
The Future of Indonesia's
Foreign Policy?
While President Jokowi demonstrated
that Indonesia remains "open for business" during his participation
in the summits in Beijing, Nay Pyi Taw and Brisbane, such assertions were
arguably made with the domestic audience in mind. As a figure who won his presidency on the
basis of promises to strengthen Indonesia's economic capacity, it is
understandable that his first opportunity to engage the world was used to make
good on such promises. Even President
Jokowi's call for Indonesia to become a "global maritime nexus" has
very strong economic undertones, aimed at further strengthening Indonesia's
resilience in the face of today's global economic challenges.
The experience of the previous
Indonesian President indicates that foreign policy remains beyond the awareness
of most Indonesians. Despite Yudhoyono's
achievements abroad, not enough were given recognition (let alone, celebrated)
at home. At times, they were even
criticized, as the public perceived Yudhoyono to be aloof, more willing to
spend time with his international counterparts than tackling the difficult
issues holding back this evolving democracy.
And when Indonesians do comment on foreign policy issues, it is often
with a hint of lament, reflecting the view that foreign policy activism have
nothing to do with national economic development. Even on the issue of sovereignty and
territorial integrity, many Indonesians have never been entirely sure of the
significance of foreign engagement through diplomacy. Therefore, when looking at President Jokowi’s
foreign policy approaches up to the moment, it is easy to conclude that they
have mostly been formulated with a view to appealing to the domestic public.
This impression was strengthened
when Indonesia's new Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, recently informed the
Parliament that the four main objectives of the country's foreign policy are:
1) preserving territorial integrity; 2) protecting Indonesian citizens abroad;
3) economic diplomacy, aimed at strengthening national economic resilience; and
4) active participation in regional and international affairs. While the fourth objective is outlined in
the nation's constitution, the first three are the ones most often demanded of
Indonesia's diplomats. During
Yudhoyono's era, the issues pertaining to these three objectives were
constantly raised by President Jokowi's PDI-P Party (the opposition at the
time) to question Yudhoyono's foreign policy activism.
Indeed, the three issues mentioned
above have been regarded as the ones that matter the most to the general
Indonesian public. To many, it may be difficult to understand how leadership in
ASEAN would directly translate into prosperity for Indonesians. If anything, many fear that opening up to the
rest of the region would be to the detriment of most Indonesians, left to
compete in the open against other national economies. Thus the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area has been
seen by some as paving the way for a flood of Chinese products and the
potential decimation of Indonesia's small and medium enterprises.
If the trend toward defining
national objectives in narrow, concrete terms continues, then Indonesia could
find itself accused of self-interest instead of playing a larger role in
promoting regional peace and security.
This would be a clear departure from the years of President Yudhoyono,
who was often more than willing to try to work out possible solutions to
regional conflicts, even when these did not directly affect Indonesia, as was
shown during Indonesia's efforts to bring Thailand and Cambodia to the
negotiating table during the border conflict over Preah Vihear in 2008. Would present tendencies also cause Indonesia
to retreat from its commitment to maintaining an influential role in managing
maritime conflicts by, among other things, pushing for a Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea?
Notwithstanding
these concerns, it needs to be recognized that as a former self-made
entrepreneur, President Jokowi does have a global perspective. He has engaged foreign partners from across
the world throughout his business career. Most people would recognize this when
watching President Jokowi’s command of English during the APEC CEO Summit, or
the way in which he appeared comfortable among the world’s influential leaders
during the trips in China, Myanmar, and Australia. However, thinking like a businessman, it is
possible that President Jokowi’s keenness in foreign affairs is based on a
calculated need for commercial expansion, or in this case, the pragmatic
demands of the Indonesian people.
Indonesia’s Constitution stipulates
the importance of participating actively in international affairs in order to
promote international security and peace. Yudhoyono, a former UN Peacekeeper,
recognized that Indonesia could play a leading role in ASEAN to push for
regional peace and stability, based on norms-setting, confidence-building, and
preventative diplomacy. This does not mean that President Widodo is otherwise
and unlikely to be imaginative in his foreign policy choices. But, with the government these days being
demanded to exercise a more "Indonesia first" attitude, it seems that
the priorities for such constitutional demands may have to change. For example,
citizen services abroad and economic diplomacy would most likely be achieved
through more intensive bilateral cooperation instead of regional and
multilateral diplomacy.
Closing
In a previous YSF Policy Paper, the
author argued that Indonesia not only has the capacity but also the activist
inclinations of a true "middle power". The attendance of Foreign Minister Marsudi at
the 4th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in
Brisbane would seem to demonstrate that this thesis is, in fact, correct. After all, MIKTA, which was conceived in 2012
on the sidelines of the Los Cabos G-20 Summit, is labeled an informal and
non-exclusive group of "middle powers" that aims to address common
challenges posed by the increasingly complex international environment. As a middle power, Indonesia would be in a
position to continue its role in balancing the interests of many powers in the
region.
Considering
its population, strategic geography, economic growth, and achievements in
political reform, democracy, and human rights, Indonesia is indeed an emerging
force in international relations. Nevertheless, even if Indonesians wanted to,
having a “middle-sized” economy and/or a “middle-sized” military does not
immediately translate into their country calling itself as a middle power. To be regarded as such and to make that
status actually mean something, Indonesia needs to “act” like a middle power. Then
again, one might argue that high expectations for Indonesia's international
activism have mostly come from external sources, including neighboring
countries. The reality is that probably Indonesians
have never been truly comfortable with such a foreign policy role, particularly
when many other issues remain unaddressed at home.
And this seems to be where
Indonesia's foreign policy is at the moment. Carried by the momentum of
Yudhoyono's decade-long internationalism, Indonesia's diplomacy is at the point
of lifting off. Yet, there are now questions being raised about Indonesia's
will to make that extra push to the next level. Resorting to a more pragmatic, "Indonesia
first" foreign policy may be good enough for the domestic public. If anything, this has all along been the
demand of the general Indonesian public, who are probably mostly uninterested
in the complexities of international affairs.
But, would this condition be in the interest of the rest of the region?
