Overcoming the China-US Rivalry: Time for a New Regional Order?

When the Cold War ended almost three decades ago, many believed that bipolar politics had finally ended for good.  However, the world actually became an even more uncertain place; lasting peace was nowhere to be found. And now, as we brace ourselves to weather the escalating trade war between China and the US, there are those who feel that a new Cold War is rapidly in the making.

Many Americans think that preventing China from disrupting the regional order benefits not only the US, but also the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.  Meanwhile, the Chinese believe that they are simply correcting the injustices that have historically been dealt to them by foreign powers.  Therefore, any country that intends to preserve the status quo is seen as perpetuating such injustices.

These geopolitical changes have provided rich grounds for academics and foreign policymakers to generate ideas in the pursuit of global order. Recently, the discourse has focused on the development of an Indo-Pacific cooperation framework. And for its part, Indonesia is pushing for an ASEAN-centric, inclusive Indo-Pacific region that is conducive for peaceful dialogue and multi-field cooperation.

At the same time, it is important that we also keep our minds open to the possibility of other forms of cooperation that could take shape around the world.

In his publication titled The China Choice, Australian Professor Hugh White outlined that there are more than two choices for the US in dealing with China. The first two choices are obvious: to confront the Chinese (as a means to preserve America’s dominance in the region) OR to allow China’s rise (while hoping that the Chinese would refrain from causing conflicts).

Professor White argued that the third choice is for the US to share power with China. Considering that both countries can deny leadership to the other, it is impossible for either China or the US to single-handedly dominate the Asia-Pacific. In other words, the idea of the US maintaining uncontested leadership in the region is as illusory as the fear that China will one day rule over the Asia-Pacific.

Professor White then suggested the possible establishment of a new concert of Asia, which is loosely modeled on the Concert of Europe that existed between 1815 and 1914.  Indeed, the Concert of Europe was far from perfect; conflicts continued to exist during the period, including the war for German unification. The Concert of Europe also ended with the outbreak of World War I. 

Nevertheless, when looking at European inter-state relations during those 99 years, conflicts among major countries were avoided because each of them recognize that they cannot dominate the entire region. During that period as well, Europe experienced massive growths in the economic, social, and political fields.  Such conditions founded Europe’s current influential position in international affairs.

According to Professor White, an Asian version of this concert would have four “great powers”, namely the US, China, Japan, and India, as well as “middle powers” such as South Korea, Australia, and Indonesia.  According to him, the rules of this “Asian Concert” are straightforward:

1. Such great power must accept the legitimacy of the other’s political system.  In other words, the US should cease causing domestic instabilities in China;

1. By agreeing to disagree, each great power must be willing to make concessions in order to achieve resolutions through peaceful negotiations;

1. Each great power must allow others to build up armaments, and allow the use of them if there are forces challenging their status as a great power; and

1. All the powers must be able to develop a “code of conduct” that would “govern” interactions with one another.

Of course, this perspective is not foolproof. Indonesia’s role as a middle power is eclipsed by the “great power politics”. Yet we all know that Indonesia is the largest country and economy in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, although the Concert of Europe in its time brought peace to the people, the conditions may not be the same in today’s Asia-Pacific.  The Austria, Prussia, Russia and the UK of that old period are different from today’s China, the US, Japan, and India.  And most interestingly, the great powers of the past were never economically inter-linked so closely like today’s influential countries.

Regardless, in striving for an Indo-Pacific regional architecture, it is important that we constantly think outside of the box. This even includes embracing ideas and perspectives that are as brave as Professor White’s.

In dealing with China, we must go beyond the choices of confronting the Chinese head-on OR appeasing their rise to dominance. There must be a more nuanced third, or even fourth choice.  If China keeps on growing, then its economic and political clout would be overwhelming. Therefore, in the interest of most countries in the region—including Indonesia—it is important to “negotiate” a new relationship with China before the power balance further shifts in the Chinese’ way.

Reformasi, Antikorupsi, dan Perkembangan Sepakbola di Tiongkok

Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, banyak pihak yang melihat dengan takjub perkembangan sepakbola di Tiongkok. Saya masih ingat 10 tahun lalu, ketika saya pertama kali tinggal di Beijing, dan sering bermain dengan teman-teman dari Amerika Latin. Di lapangan sebelah tempat kita bermain biasanya juga diisi pemain asing. Tapi sekarang, lapangan bola di Beijing selalu dipenuhi masyarakat lokal. Dan jumlah lapangannya pun telah bertambah berkali lipat.

Belum lagi berita-berita terbaru mengenai pemain-pemain asing yang berkiprah di Chinese Super League. Bahkan tim favorit saya, FC Barcelona pun menemukan Paulinho di Guangzhou Evergrande untuk mengisi kekosongan yang ditinggalkan Neymar Jr. Dan ternyata, Paulinho jauh lebih hebat dari yang diharapkan, walaupun memang sangat sulit menggantikan seorang Neymar Jr. Setidaknya, pembelian Paulinho dari Guangzhou menunjukkan bahwa tingkat permainan di CSL sudah menjadi perhatian tim-tim di Eropa.

 

Nah, dalam artikel ini, saya ingin sedikit berbagi mengenai sepakbola di Tiongkok.

 

Sebagaimana organisasi-organisasi lain di Tiongkok, China Football Association (CFA) berada di bawah kendali pemerintahan. Secara spesifik, CFA berada di bawah naungan State General Administration of Sports, yang di Indonesia setara dengan Kementerian Pemuda dan Olahraga. FIFA mentolerir hal tersebut mengingat bentuk pemerintahan di Tiongkok, di mana segala aspek kehidupan penduduk dikontrol dan diawasi oleh Pemerintah.

 

CSL dibentuk pada tahun 2004 sebagai liga tertinggi sepakbola di Tiongkok untuk menggantikan Jia A League. Pembentukan CSL utamanya dikarenakan kegagalan Tiongkok pada Piala Dunia 2002 di Jepang-Korea, di mana Timnas Tiongkok kalah tiga kali dan tidak menghasilkan satu gol pun sepanjang turnamen.

 

Untuk dapat berpartisipasi dalam CSL, para tim diharuskan mempunyai manajemen yang professional, keuangan yang transparan, dan youth program yang dapat menghasilkan pemain-pemain lokal. Persayaratan-persyaratan ini diharapkan dapat mengangkat kualitas sepakbola di Tiongkok secara umum.

Namun demikian, upaya tersebut tidak membuahkan hasil yang diharapkan karena semakin banyaknya uang yang mengalir ke CSL justru membuat kompetisi semakin diwarnai kasus-kasus korupsi. Korupsi dan sogok-menyogok seringnya dilakukan oleh pejabat-pejabat daerah. Beberapa tindakan ilegal yang merusak citra CSL termasuk:

• Maraknya perjudian, terutama yang dilakukan oleh para pejabat lokal
• Pengaturan skor oleh pemilik klub, terutama untuk menguntungkan pejabat-pejabat lokal
• Sogok-menyogok untuk dapat mengirim pemain klub ke Timnas Tiongkok, yang sering dilakukan oleh pemilik tim lokal guna meningkatkan pamor klub.

Kasus korupsi dan sogok biasanya melibatkan pemain (utamanya para pemain bek dan kiper) atau pelatih. Hal ini dikarenakan gaji pemain dan wasit yang sangat rendah. Pelatih klub biasanya tidak tahu-menahu, dan sering menjadi pihak yang dirugikan karena kelakuan pemain dan wasit.

 

Dampak dari keterpurukan pesepakbolaan di Tiongkok adalah menurunnya interest masyarakat Tiongkok untuk bermain atau menonton sepakbola professional di negara mereka sendiri. Berbagai kegagalan Timnas Tiongkok juga menjadi bahan cemoohan masyarakat, yang tidak percaya bahwa dari 1,3 milyar penduduk Tiongkok tidak dapat dicari 11 orang untuk bermain sepakbola yang kompetitif, setidaknya di Asia.

 

Kondisi yang buruk ini mencapai titik nadir pada tahun 2009, ketika pemain-pemain Qingdao Hailifeng “tidak berhasil” membiarkan lawannya menang lebih dari empat gol. Kegagalan ini dikatakan akhirnya menyebabkan pemilik klub Qingdao Hailifeng rugi judi besar-besaran.

 

Melihat kondisi ini, akhirnya Pemerintah Pusat bertekad untuk memberikan perhatian lebih terhadap CFA dan CSL, dan melakukan reformasi internal yang progresif dan disiplin. Upaya ini secara individu dimulai oleh Presiden Xi Jinping, yang pada waktu itu masih menjabat sebagai Wakil Presiden RRT. Xi Jinping adalah penggemar sepakbola dan telah mengarahlan agar berbagai upaya sejak tahun 2009 dapat mempersiapkan kondisi yang kondusif untuk pengembangan sepakbola di Tiongkok pada saat Xi Jinping nantinya menjadi Presiden RRT.

 

Dengan tekad ini, maka dimulailah kampanye anti-korupsi di CFA dan CSL. Saat berkunjung ke Jerman pada tahun 2009, Xi Jinping mengatakan bahwa sepakbola di Tiongkok harus menjadi sumber kebanggaan nasional. Dua minggu kemudian, 16 pejabat CFA dan CSL serta pemain klub ditangkap polisi karena terbukti menerima atau memberikan sogokan.

 

Kampanye anti-korupsi di tubuh CFA dan CSL berlangsung dari 2009 sampai dengan 2012. Dalam periode tersebut, setidaknya 58 pejabat CFA dan CSL ditangkap dan dijatuhkan hukuman sampai dengan 10 tahun penjara. Beberapa pejabat termasuk dua orang mantan Ketua CFA, beberapa pemain Timnas Tiongkok ternama, dan seorang wasit di Tiongkok yang paling terkenal.

 

Kampanye anti-korupsi dilakukan baik oleh Pemerintah (melalui Kementerian Supervisi) maupun Partai Komunis Tiongkok (PKT). Hal ini dapat dilakukan karena segenap pejabat CFA dan CSL adalah pegawai pemerintahan dan fungsionaris PKT.

 

Sambil dilakukannya kampanye anti-korupsi, Pemerintah RRT juga mendorong partisipasi perusahaan-perusahaan swasta untuk mendanai klub-klub CSL. Perusahaan-perusahaan yang menanggapi dorongan Pemerintah termasuk Alibaba Group (sponsor utama Guangzhou Evergrande FC), Suning (perusahaan peralatan elektronik terbesar di Tiongkok, sponsor utama Jiangsu Sainty FC), dan SIPG (perusahaan manajemen pelabuhan, sponsor utama Shanghai Shanggang FC). 

 

Klub-klub juga melakukan pendekatan kepada masyarakat lokal, termasuk dengan menciptakan merchandising yang bagus, memudahkan pembelian tiket masuk, dan melakukan berbagai program kemasyarakatan. Dukungan para fans lokal menjadi salah satu tumpuan sumber keuangan bagi setiap klub. Secara umum, jumlah fans yang mengunjungi stadion setiap harinya meningkat. Begitu juga dengan jumlah yang menonton pertandingan-pertandingan via tv dari rumah.

 

Setelah menjadi Presiden RRT, Xi Jinping meneruskan niatnya untuk membenahi sepakbola di Tiongkok dengan menjadikan isu ini sebagai salah satu isu yang dibahas pada saat kongres nasional tahun 2013. Dalam pidatonya di hadapan para anggota National People’s Congress (NPC), Presiden Xi manyampaikan bahwa revitalisasi sepakbola di Tiongkok akan menjadikan Tiongkok sebagai negara olahraga yang kuat, yang merupakan bagian inti dari pencapaian China Dream yang dia visikan.

 

Pada tahun 2015, akhirnya NPC mengeluarkan 50-Point Plan terkait dengan revitalisasi sepakbola di Tiongkok. Beberapa target kunci adalah:

• Meningkatkan profesionalitas klub-klub CSL, dengan mendorong partisipasi perusahaan-perusahaan lokal dari berbagai bidang usaha sebagai sponsor klub
• Menciptakan basis yang kuat bagi pengembangan sepakbola dengan memberdayakan organisasi-organisasi sepakbola di tingkat grassroots serta sekolah-sekolah sepakbola
• Meningkatkan jumlah anak-anak di Tiongkok yang bermain sepakbola
• Membuka sekolah-sekolah sepakbola baru, yang jumlahnya diharapkan mencapai 20 ribu pada tahun 2020 dan 50 ribu pada than 2025 (saat ini jumlahnya masih 5 ribu)
• Mengucurkan dana ke sistem pendidikan agar menjadikan sepakbola sebagai salah program kurikulum pendidikan nasional
• Terus meningkatkan program anti-korupsi di CFA dan CSL, yang sejalan dengan kampanye anti-korupsi yang gencar dilakukan di berbagai tingkatan pemerintahan di Tiongkok saat ini
• Menciptakan kondisi yang kondusif untuk menarik kedatangan pemain-pemain dan pelatih-pelatih asing yang berkualitas

Reformasi dan revitalisasi CFA dan CSL juga akan dilakukan dengan secara pelan-pelan menjadikan CFA independen dari Pemerintah (sebagaimana harapan FIFA selama ini). Diharapkan CFA dan CSL nantinya akan diisi dengan professional dan berorientasikan bisnis. Artinya, CSL dan masing-masing klub anggotanya akan di-manage bagaikan perusahaan, dan harus untung secara finansial.

 

Selain itu, Pemerintah RRT juga telah mengundang IMG Worldwide Inc untuk me-manage CSL secara professional. Pemerintah Pusat masih mengawasi CFA dan CSL, tetapi keberadaan pejabat-pejabat pemerintahan dan PKT semakin dikurangi. 

 

Tiga target jangka panjang 50 Point Plan di bidang sepakbola yang diinisiasi Presiden Xi Jinping adalah: 1) membentuk basis yang kokoh bagi pengembangan Timnas Tiongkok yang kompetitif di ajang internasional, dan dapat masuk ke putaran final Piala Dunia; 2) menjadi tuan rumah Piala Dunia; dan 3) menjadi salah satu kandidat juara Piala Dunia

 

In Hindsight: Some Thoughts on Jokowi's Foreign Policy

In 2015, in the run up to the Young Strategists Forum Alumni Conference, which was held in Tokyo, Japan, I published a paper on the possible shape of Indonesia's foreign policy in the future.  The paper took into account President Joko Widodo's recent rise to power, and the newly formed Indonesian Government's attempt to distance itself from the foreign policy achievements of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The paper was included in a collection of views entitled "Next Generation Perspectives on the Future of Asian Security", which was edited by Princeton University Professor Aaron Friedberg.

Some of the views I shared in this short paper remains valid to this day, while others have completely been inaccurate.  Regardless, as President Joko Widodo approaches re-elections, Indonesia's appeal in the international community remains high, with considerable achievements in bilateral engagements with key countries as well as regional and global community building with the likes of ASEAN, IORA, APEC, Asia-Africa, and the UN.

Below is the paper, for those who are interested in reading, particularly because it was previously only available in pdf form and rather difficult to obtain over google.  Your suggestions and criticism are welcome.

Looking for Clues in

Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the Jokowi Era

by Santo Darmosumarto

Less than three weeks after he had just been sworn in as Indonesia's seventh President, Joko Widodo embarked on a whirlwind tour of three countries, attending four summits, and introducing himself to the leaders of the region.  Indeed, President Joko Widodo (more popularly known as "Jokowi") was a figure much sought after by the likes of Chinese President Xi Jinping, American President Barack Obama, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, all whom Jokowi met at his first stop in Beijing. Among these three leaders, there was a sense of eagerness as to how President Jokowi would respond to their invitations to form partnerships. 

Three months later, views on how President Jokowi performed at the APEC, ASEAN, East Asia, and G-20 Summits are diverse.  Some feel reaffirmed in their belief that President Jokowi is a novice policymaker[1], while others are surprised at the apparent ease with which the Indonesian leader stood shoulder to shoulder with Xi, Obama, Abe, and other figures[2]. Undoubtedly, differences could be drawn between the foreign policy approaches of President Jokowi, and those of his predecessor, the more seasoned internationalist, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, the more pertinent question is whether such differences would lead to major shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy.

As the largest country in ASEAN, the fourth largest population in the world, and the only Southeast Asian country in the G-20, Indonesia under the guidance of Yudhoyono has grown into an influential player, not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in global affairs.  And while Yudhoyono’s successor is popular at home, not much is known about his views, let alone his track record in foreign affairs.  Indeed, Widodo did not win Indonesia’s presidency because of his foreign policy platform.  Instead, his success was primarily based on a promise to pay more attention to domestic issues.  This has led many to question whether Indonesia would continue on its trajectory to become an influential “middle power” in regional and international affairs. 

Indonesia's Foreign Policy During the Yudhoyono Years 

After years of soul-searching in the wake of the multi-dimensional turmoil following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, former President Yudhoyono was successful in commandeering Indonesia's re-emergence as an influential player in the region, and even at the global level.  Re-adapting Indonesia's foreign policy philosophy of "free and active" diplomacy to current geostrategic conditions, Yudhoyono was a darling of the international community, as he advocated "a million friends, zero enemies" and pushed for a "dynamic equilibrium" in power relations in the region. In 2012, at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Yudhoyono proposed the construction of an "architecture of durable peace in the Asia-Pacific".  He even dared to dream of "a harmony among civilizations", during a well-received speech at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. 

In a global order still plagued by uncertainties, Yudhoyono appeared determined to strengthen Indonesia's capacity to become a key balancer, mediator, and mobilizer, at least in the Asia-Pacific region.  And why should it not be?  At least in theory, a developing, Asian, and predominantly Muslim country like Indonesia should be better accepted by both the developing and developed worlds; the North and the South; the Muslim countries and the rest. As if responding to criticisms from certain corners that Indonesia had been "punching below its weight"[3], Yudhoyono, ably assisted by his foreign ministers (Hassan Wirajuda, and then, Marty Natalegawa) worked hard to raise Indonesia's global profile.

Much of the impetus for this effort derives from the potential leverage provided by the Indonesia’s large population, economic boom, strategic geographical location, and continued democratic and human rights achievements.  Moreover, Indonesia is recognized as the natural leader of ASEAN, as the regional organization strives to become the center of the Asia-Pacific’s architecture for cooperation. As part of the G-20, Indonesia frequently raised development issues among the world’s top earning countries. And as Co-Chair of the UN High Level Panel on Post-2015 Development Agenda, Yudhoyono pressed “third world” issues such as sustainable development, poverty, inequality, and the protection of the environment.  Moreover, on regional security issues, by seeking a "dynamic equilibrium", Indonesia under Yudhoyono avoided common tendencies to simply hedge against China’s influence in the region.  At the same time, Indonesia was not interested in relying on a US-based regional security guarantee.

These developments, over a decade of Yudhoyono’s leadership, have raised questions about the shape of Indonesia's foreign policy after his presidency. These questions frequently center on the assumption that new President Jokowi has limited foreign affairs credentials, and that he has risen to the top of Indonesia's political scene on the basis of his views on domestic issues instead.  Regardless, expectations, both at home and abroad, are high. 

Looking for Clues in Jokowi's Foreign Policy Vision 

During his election campaign, President Jokowi gave a few insights on his expectations for Indonesia's foreign policy., including, the need for it to play the role of an honest broker in dealing with the South China Sea issue.  This view was delivered with the caveat that, as a non-claimant state, Indonesia does not have direct interest in how the territorial disputes are ultimately resolved.[4]  On other occasions, President Jokowi mentioned his goal of furthering Indonesia's interests abroad through maximizing its influence in ASEAN.[5]  Meanwhile, on multilateral issues, President Jokowi highlighted the need to carry out reforms of global financial institutions to better serve the interests of developing countries, like Indonesia.

Other than these glimpses of foreign policy activism, however, President Jokowi's election campaign was very much dominated by domestic issues ranging from fuel subsidies to good governance to economic resilience.  Hence, there was much anticipation as to how President Jokowi would introduce himself, and his foreign policy vision, during the summits in Beijing, Nay Pyi Taw, and Brisbane at the end of 2014.  At least, many observers were looking for clues on whether Yudhoyono’s foreign policy activism would be carried over by the new administration in Jakarta.  On the back of major domestic difficulties and divisive rivalry among its major political parties, would Indonesia revert to a more introvert stance of the world?  Or would it continue to pursue its role as the "middle power" in the Asia-Pacific, willing to stick its neck out in order to ensure balance among the major and emerging powers in the region?

On his first opportunity to address the international community during the APEC CEO Summit, President Jokowi gave a presentation on Indonesia's readiness to welcome investors.  While recognizing the significance of foreign participation in the country's economic development, President Jokowi emphasized the concrete actions that would be carried out domestically to raise investor confidence.  He highlighted some of the problems affecting Indonesia's business sector, and gave his commitment to addressing these problems in the most efficient and timely way.  While the presentation did receive a warm welcome from the audience (who were mostly businesspeople and the media), it did not elaborate on his vision of Indonesia’s maritime prowess.

In Nay Pyi Taw, however, President Jokowi outlined Indonesia's ambition to become a "Global Maritime Nexus".  The pursuit of this goal would be carried out based on the five pillars of: 1) reviving the Indonesian people's maritime culture; 2) building maritime "food sovereignty" through a strengthened fisheries industry; 3) boosting the maritime economy through strengthening connectivity (infrastructure) and tourism; 4) strengthening maritime diplomacy to overcome traditional and non-traditional conflicts at sea; and 5) bolstering maritime defenses to uphold territorial integrity and safeguard national security.[6]  President Jokowi also recognized Indonesia's role as a "fulcrum between two oceans", a position which demands the country's activism in addressing regional maritime security and safety of navigation issues.

The events in China and Myanmar led to some commentators highlighting the maritime and economic aspects of Indonesia's new diplomacy under President Jokowi.  But while some are intrigued at how other countries could take advantage of Indonesia's interest in these issues to further their own foreign policy designs, others are already asking more long-term questions.  Will Indonesia’s focus on maritime and economic issues be enough to drive a foreign policy that leads to some form of leadership in the region?  Or are these issues simply raised with a view to securing Indonesia's domestic agenda, thus paying little heed to the greater demands for participation in ensuring regional peace and stability? 

The Future of Indonesia's Foreign Policy? 

While President Jokowi demonstrated that Indonesia remains "open for business" during his participation in the summits in Beijing, Nay Pyi Taw and Brisbane, such assertions were arguably made with the domestic audience in mind.  As a figure who won his presidency on the basis of promises to strengthen Indonesia's economic capacity, it is understandable that his first opportunity to engage the world was used to make good on such promises.  Even President Jokowi's call for Indonesia to become a "global maritime nexus" has very strong economic undertones, aimed at further strengthening Indonesia's resilience in the face of today's global economic challenges.

The experience of the previous Indonesian President indicates that foreign policy remains beyond the awareness of most Indonesians.  Despite Yudhoyono's achievements abroad, not enough were given recognition (let alone, celebrated) at home.  At times, they were even criticized, as the public perceived Yudhoyono to be aloof, more willing to spend time with his international counterparts than tackling the difficult issues holding back this evolving democracy.  And when Indonesians do comment on foreign policy issues, it is often with a hint of lament, reflecting the view that foreign policy activism have nothing to do with national economic development.  Even on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity, many Indonesians have never been entirely sure of the significance of foreign engagement through diplomacy.  Therefore, when looking at President Jokowi’s foreign policy approaches up to the moment, it is easy to conclude that they have mostly been formulated with a view to appealing to the domestic public.

This impression was strengthened when Indonesia's new Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, recently informed the Parliament that the four main objectives of the country's foreign policy are: 1) preserving territorial integrity; 2) protecting Indonesian citizens abroad; 3) economic diplomacy, aimed at strengthening national economic resilience; and 4) active participation in regional and international affairs.[7]   While the fourth objective is outlined in the nation's constitution, the first three are the ones most often demanded of Indonesia's diplomats.  During Yudhoyono's era, the issues pertaining to these three objectives were constantly raised by President Jokowi's PDI-P Party (the opposition at the time) to question Yudhoyono's foreign policy activism. 

Indeed, the three issues mentioned above have been regarded as the ones that matter the most to the general Indonesian public. To many, it may be difficult to understand how leadership in ASEAN would directly translate into prosperity for Indonesians.  If anything, many fear that opening up to the rest of the region would be to the detriment of most Indonesians, left to compete in the open against other national economies.  Thus the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area has been seen by some as paving the way for a flood of Chinese products and the potential decimation of Indonesia's small and medium enterprises.

If the trend toward defining national objectives in narrow, concrete terms continues, then Indonesia could find itself accused of self-interest instead of playing a larger role in promoting regional peace and security.   This would be a clear departure from the years of President Yudhoyono, who was often more than willing to try to work out possible solutions to regional conflicts, even when these did not directly affect Indonesia, as was shown during Indonesia's efforts to bring Thailand and Cambodia to the negotiating table during the border conflict over Preah Vihear in 2008.  Would present tendencies also cause Indonesia to retreat from its commitment to maintaining an influential role in managing maritime conflicts by, among other things, pushing for a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?

Notwithstanding these concerns, it needs to be recognized that as a former self-made entrepreneur, President Jokowi does have a global perspective.  He has engaged foreign partners from across the world throughout his business career.[8]  Most people would recognize this when watching President Jokowi’s command of English during the APEC CEO Summit, or the way in which he appeared comfortable among the world’s influential leaders during the trips in China, Myanmar, and Australia.  However, thinking like a businessman, it is possible that President Jokowi’s keenness in foreign affairs is based on a calculated need for commercial expansion, or in this case, the pragmatic demands of the Indonesian people. 

Indonesia’s Constitution stipulates the importance of participating actively in international affairs in order to promote international security and peace. Yudhoyono, a former UN Peacekeeper, recognized that Indonesia could play a leading role in ASEAN to push for regional peace and stability, based on norms-setting, confidence-building, and preventative diplomacy. This does not mean that President Widodo is otherwise and unlikely to be imaginative in his foreign policy choices.  But, with the government these days being demanded to exercise a more "Indonesia first" attitude, it seems that the priorities for such constitutional demands may have to change. For example, citizen services abroad and economic diplomacy would most likely be achieved through more intensive bilateral cooperation instead of regional and multilateral diplomacy. 

Closing 

In a previous YSF Policy Paper, the author argued that Indonesia not only has the capacity but also the activist inclinations of a true "middle power".  The attendance of Foreign Minister Marsudi at the 4th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Brisbane would seem to demonstrate that this thesis is, in fact, correct.  After all, MIKTA, which was conceived in 2012 on the sidelines of the Los Cabos G-20 Summit, is labeled an informal and non-exclusive group of "middle powers" that aims to address common challenges posed by the increasingly complex international environment.[9]  As a middle power, Indonesia would be in a position to continue its role in balancing the interests of many powers in the region.

Considering its population, strategic geography, economic growth, and achievements in political reform, democracy, and human rights, Indonesia is indeed an emerging force in international relations. Nevertheless, even if Indonesians wanted to, having a “middle-sized” economy and/or a “middle-sized” military does not immediately translate into their country calling itself as a middle power.  To be regarded as such and to make that status actually mean something, Indonesia needs to “act” like a middle power. Then again, one might argue that high expectations for Indonesia's international activism have mostly come from external sources, including neighboring countries.  The reality is that probably Indonesians have never been truly comfortable with such a foreign policy role, particularly when many other issues remain unaddressed at home. 

And this seems to be where Indonesia's foreign policy is at the moment. Carried by the momentum of Yudhoyono's decade-long internationalism, Indonesia's diplomacy is at the point of lifting off. Yet, there are now questions being raised about Indonesia's will to make that extra push to the next level.  Resorting to a more pragmatic, "Indonesia first" foreign policy may be good enough for the domestic public.  If anything, this has all along been the demand of the general Indonesian public, who are probably mostly uninterested in the complexities of international affairs.  But, would this condition be in the interest of the rest of the region?

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[1] For example: Matthew Pennington, "Foreign Policy Question Mark Over Indonesia Leader", Huffington Post, 24 October 2014. Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20141024/us--united-states-indonesia-analysis/

[2] For example: Lohman, Walter.  "Widodo's Early Moves Suggest Continuity, Not Change", Nikkei Asian Review, 19 November 2014.  Source: http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/Indonesia-s-Challenge/Widodo-s-early-moves-suggest-continuity-not-change

^[3] Analyses questioning Indonesia's foreign policy influence include, for example: Dave McRae, "More Talk Than Walk: Indonesia As A Foreign Policy Actor", Analysis (Lowy Institute for International Policy), February 2014.

[4] Jhinuk Chowdhury, "New Indonesian Leader: Maritime Promises and Possible Dynamics with China, US and Australia", RT, 27 October 2014.  Source: http://rt.com/op-edge/199596-joko-widodo-indonesia-president

[5] Yohanes Sulaiman and Brad Nelson, "Time for Jokowi to Think About Foreign Policy", The Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2014.  Source: blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2014/08/01/cpmmentary-time-for-jokowi-to-think-about-foreign-policy/tab/print/

[6] Adelle Neary, "Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Nexus'", Southeast Asia from Scott Circle (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Vol. V, Issue 24, 26 November 2014.

[7] Pidato Menteri Luar Negeri Paparan Menteri Luar Negeri RI, Retno L.P. Marsudi pada Rapat Kerja Antara Komisi I DPR RI dengan Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (Speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno L.P. Marsudi at Working Meeting between the First Commission of the Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia), Jakarta, 12 February 2015.  Source: http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?IDP=818&l=id

[8] Aaron L. Connelly, "Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi", Analysis (Lowy Institute for International Policy), October 2014.

[9] Oliver, Alex.  "MIKTA: Where Middle Powers Proudly Meet", The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy), 28 November 2014. Source: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/11/28/MIKTA-useful-whether-middle-or-pivotal.aspx?COLLCC=3003138368&